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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Judge Dye dissented, and maintained that the plain words
of the policy excluded plaintiff from coverage because the judg-
ment was had against the partnership.
An insurer is liable only for those risks which it assumes in
the policy and they may limit their liability by the insertion of
any exclusion clauses which are thought proper. On the basis of
public policy insurers are usually excused from liability for crim-
inal acts of the insured whether or not they are explicitly exempted
in the agreement.8 6 But, contracts which indemnify an assured
for unlawful acts of his agents, and in which he was in no way
associated, are lawful.T
In finding that the exclusion clause was merely intended to
apply to the named assured, the court in the instant case in-
terpreted its meaning in the light of sound public policy. This
is the meaning an average policy holder of ordinary intelligence,
as well as the insurer, would attach to it.88
The Court of Appeals has thus made it clear to insurers that
even though there exist very little ambiguity they should spell
out explicitly the limits which they intend to place on their obli-
gations. The construction given under such circumstances will
be in favor of the assured since the insurer is the draftsman.
Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds set about to remedy the abuse of oral
contracts and declared that certain agreements would be void un-
less some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and signed by
the party to be charged. 9 The purpose of the memo is to prevent
the enforcement of contracts that were never made.70
64. 6 COrOLy, BsiEss o-x INsuR. cE 5618 (2d ed. 1928); Devitt v. Continental
Casualty Co., 269 N. Y. 474, 109 N. E. 765 (1936); Ga!es v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 240 App. Div. 444, 270 N. Y. Supp. 282 (4th Dep't), dppeal denied, 265 N. Y.
510, 193 N. E. 296 (1934).
65. "The purpose of the exclusion clause is to exclude certain risks or probabilities
of injury which the insurer considered too great to cover." Standard Surety and
Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 281 App. Div. 446, 119 N. Y. S. 2d 795 (4th
Dep't 1953).
66. "Liability insurance does not indemnify the insured for his own wanton as-
saults, or assaults committed by his agents if directed by him. There are two reasons
for this. Firstly, the injuries sustained by a person assaulted by the insured are not
accidentally suffered, but result from wilful conduct. Secondly, public policy forbids an
agreement indemnifying against wanton and criminal conduct." 1 RICHARDS, INSURMACE§ 17.
-7. 1 RicriAns, I.xSURA cE § 17; Taxicab Motor Co. v. Pacific Coast Cas.
Co., 73 Wash. 631, 639, 132 P. 393, 396 (1913).
68. See Burr v. Commercial Traveler Mutual Accidcnt Assn., 295 N. Y. 294, 301,
67 N. E. 2d 248, 251, 166 A. L. R. 462 (1946).
69. PEns. PRop. LAw § 31.
70. 2 CoPmix, CoTRaAcTs § 498.
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If the - riting lacks formality but adequately proves the ex-
istence of a contract it should be admitted.71 Where only one of
two separate documents are signed they will satisfy the Statute,72
however, this raises the problem of what is required to 'connect
the writings. A theory has been advanced that requires the docu-
ments specifically to refer to one another without the aid of
parol evidence. 73 The better rule is that the papers need only refer
to the same transaction or subject matter,74 and that parol evi-
dence may be used to show this integration.75
In Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Corp.,17 the Court of Appeals
adopted this rule,77 when the plaintiff brought suit for the breach
of an employment contract he had allegedly negotiated with the
defendant. Three separate documents were put into evidence. The
first purports to be an "Employment Agreement with Nate
Crabtree . . .," transcribed by the defendant's secretary during
the negotiations with the plaintiff. The second and third docu-
ments were "payroll change" cards which contained the names of
the parties and the stipulated salary. Both were signed; the first
by the general manager, who was present at the bargaining, and
the latter by the comptroller. The defendant refused to approve
the latter card. The court allowed oral testimony that the negotia-
tions were to the same effect as the facts presented by the papers.
They concluded that all three referred to the same transaction and
contained all the necessary terms of the contract. Therefore,
the plaintiff was not barred by the Statute of Frauds.
It is evident that an agreement did exist in this case; all the
terms of the contract were set forth in writings and at least one of
the papers had been signed by the defendant or her agents. The
rule which disallows connecting the papers by parol evidence serves
no useful purpose. The doors to fraud are not opened by the rule78
adopted by the court. Rather, it prevents individuals from cir-
cumventing their obligations on the basis of mere technicalities.
71. "It matters not how informal or bunglingly constructed the memorandum
may be." Spiegel v. Lowenstien, 162 App. Div. 443, 448, 147 N. Y. Supp. 655, 658 (3d
Dep't 1914) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs § 207.
72. Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N. Y. 158, 123 N. EZ 139 (1919); Spiegel v. Lowenstien,
supra note 71; 2 WILLISTOx, Co L.CTs § 568 (Rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEmENT, CON-
TRACTS § 208, comment b, (iii).
73. Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N. Y. 314, 44 N. E. 952 (1896) ; James Tal-
colt Inc. v. Greenstein, 210 App. Div. 633, 206 N. Y. Supp. 471 (1st Dep't 1924).
74. Peck v. Vandermark, 99 N. Y. 29, 1 N. Ea 41 (1885) ; Coe v. Tough, 116 N. Y.
273, 122 N. E. 550 (1889).
75. Marks v. Cowdin, supra note 72.
76. 305 N. Y. 48, 110 N. E. 2d 551 (1953).
77. "[Tjhis court has on number of occasions approved the rule, and we now
definitely adopt it, permitting the signed and unsigned documents to be read together,
provided that they clearly refer to the same subject matter or transaction." Id. at 55,
110 N. E. 2d at 113.
78. 2 CoRam. CozTRAcTs § 498.
